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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WHEN FACTS ARE IN
DISPUTE
Leon Friedman*
JUDGE PRATT:
I look forward to an exciting day here. So let's get started with
the qualified immunity problems, and Leon, it is all yours.
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN:
There were two Supreme Court cases on qualified immunity.' I
want to be sure to cover those. There was also a case that was
almost decided by the Court and I would like to spend a little more
attention on that one.2
The cases on qualified immunity that were decided emphasized
and perhaps changed the law, a little bit, on the sequence of
deciding issues in a section 1983 case.' At one time, when
someone would assert that his or her constitutional rights were
violated, the defense to such an assertion was that this is not a
constitutional right. Even if there was a constitutional right, there
is doubt as to whether such a right was clearly established, thereby
entitling the government official to qualified immunity. The courts
for the most part would not get into the issue of whether there was
* Leon Friedman, Joseph Kushner Dist. Prof. Hofstra. B.A., 1954; LL.B., 1960,
Harvard. Grad. Student, Hist., Harvard GSAS, 1954-55.
1Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999) and Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692
(1999).
2 Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998) City found not liable and
police officer granted qualified immunity in § 1983 action brought by civil
rights plaintiff who was shot in the back while fleeing the officer.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides in pertainant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
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a constitutional right because in any event the right was not clearly
established at the time.4 The Supreme Court dealt with that issue a
second time, and it is an easy way to get out of the whole issue.
Indeed, the Second Circuit and other circuits have had a doctrine
that avoids constitutional questions.' Therefore a case is decided
without getting to a constitutional question. It was easy for a court
to say that a constitutional right was asserted, and we are not really
sure whether there is such a constitutional right, but in any event it
was not clearly established. Therefore, the defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity.
The trouble with such an approach is that you never know
whether there is a constitutional fight. Qualified immunity can go
on forever, because no one ever decides whether there was a
constitutional right. Therefore, if the whole point is to establish a
fight, then make sure everybody knows what it is, and enforce it
thereafter. By deciding a case on qualified immunity you stop the
process from continuing.
In 1998, the Supreme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis6
stated that the preferred approach is for district court judges to
define the right, to decide whether there is a constitutional right,
and then to reach the issue of qualified immunity.' The preferred
approach is to look at the right, define it, make sure you know
what it is and then turn to the issue of qualified immunity.
If the government claims that there is such a right but it was not
established until they told you there was such a right, at least
thereafter it is established. If a government official acts thereafter,
he would not be able to rely on qualified immunity. In two cases
from last term, the Supreme Court, instead of saying this is the
preferred approach, held that this is the approach district courts
must use.

4 See

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)(noting that "[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right").
5 See, e.g.,

X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999).

6 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). A high-speed chase

with no intent to harm that resulted in the death of a passenger did not violate a
14 d Amendment substantive due process right.
7523 U.S. 833, 841, n.5.
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In Conn v. Gabbert,s a lawyer was searched outside the grand
jury room. The Ninth Circuit felt that this conduct was so clearly a
constitutional violation that they did not have to look at any
precedent? Government officials cannot search a lawyer while he
is advising his client outside the grand jury room."0 The Supreme
Court found the case to be a slam dunk. The Court held there was
no such right." It just goes to show how the law is an exact
science, right? 2
Therefore, according to Conn v. Gabbert, a court must first
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an
actual constitutional right. 3
Once the plaintiff alleges a
deprivation, they must determine whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. 4
Almost immediately in Wilson v. Layne, the press "ride-along"
case, the Court repeats the language of Siegert v. Gilley. 5 The
Court found that "a court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity
must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the
deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all." 6 In theory, that
is the preferred method.

8 Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S.Ct. 1292. (1999). Prosecutors in the "Menendez
Brothers" murder trial learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to Traci
Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the frst trial.
Baker later responded that she had given the letter to her attorney, Paul Gabbert.
When Baker appeared to testify before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert,
prosecutor Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the
letter Id. at 1292-1294.
9 Id. at 1295. "The Court of Appeals also held that based upon notions of
"'common sense,"' the right allegedly violated in this case was clearly
established, and as a result, Coan and Najera were not entitled to qualified
immunity....*" Id quoting Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d, 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1997).
'0 Conn at 1295.

" Id at 1296.
'2Id. at 1295.
'3 Conn, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232233(1991)).
14Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. CL 1692 (1999). Homeowners' 14t' Amendment
rights were violated when federal marshals brought third parties
into the home
when the presence of such persons did not aid in the execution of the warrant.
See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis 523 U.S.
883 (1998).
'5 Wilson,
16Id

119 S. Ct. at 1697 (citingSiegert, 500 U.S. at 232).
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7 the Second Circuit found that "must
In Home v. Coughlin,"
means may." Therefore, it is still not necessary, we still believe
that you should avoid constitutional questions.'8
"Must" means "must" to me, therefore I do not know what is
going to happen in that area, but there are now three Supreme
Court cases speaking to this and the last two say "must."' 9 "Must"
sounds to me like "must."
Another issue decided at the Supreme Court level last year, that
goes to the heart of what I am talking about, is the issue of a
division of responsibility between a judge and a jury concerning
qualified immunity. The Court also addressed the issue of whether
certain constitutional rights have a qualified immunity component
at all.
The issue is framed as whether there is a qualified immunity
defense when there is a Fourth Amendment violation. 0 In other
words, can a government official have a reasonable belief in an
illegal search or seizure? Additionally, and more importantly, is
there qualified immunity in an excessive force case? The whole
point of qualified immunity is, of course, whether the law is clearly
established. Accordingly, a government official violates clearly
established rights, which a reasonable government official would
have been aware of.2' The issue of a reasonable government
22
official is addressed in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.

17Home

v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1998). Prison official entitled to

qualified immunity even though it did not provide inmate with substitute
counsel in a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the prisoner's confinement for
six months, because the hardship suffered by the prisoner was not an "atypical
and significant hardship." Id.
' Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1295, Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
19See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232; Conn, 119 S.Ct. at 1295, Wilson, 119 S.Ct. at

1700.
20
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment provides in pertinent part that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id.
21 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
22 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Harlow, a civilian employee who had been
terminated from his position filed suit against two senior aides and advisors of
the President of the United States alleging conspiracy to violate his
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When you are dealing with the Fourth Amendment, and
unreasonable search and seizure or excessive force, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits an unreasonable search and seizure.'
However, the qualified immunity defense relates to whether a
government official violated clearly established laws, and clearly
established rights of which a reasonable official would have been
aware.
How can a government official believe that a search was
reasonable if a court has determined that it is unreasonable? Is
there an additional layer of protection? The question you ask a
jury is, "Was this reasonable?" and they answer, "Not reasonable."
Can you then ask the jury, "But could this officer have reasonably
believed that his search was reasonable?" In other words, is there
still some scope for an extra layer of protection, and more
important, who decides that question? Is it the judge or the jury?
Can an officer reasonably believe in probable cause if the court
later finds no probable cause? In the Fourth Amendment area.
regarding unreasonable search and seizure, there is a split.
Many courts have found that it is possible for an officer to
reasonably believe that what he was doing did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, even if a court ultimately concludes that the
officer's actions did violate the Fourth Amendment. The courts
have found that all the officer has to have is arguable probable
cause.
There is a very good decision by Judge Posner on the Seventh
Circuit where he says, "How can you reasonably believe in
something that we decide was unreasonable?"2'4 In Boyce v.
Fernandes,the court held that a probable cause and an immunity
constitutional and statutory rights to result in his unlawful discharge. Id. at 802.
The U.S. District Court held that the aides were not entitled to absolute
immunity. Id at 805. The U.S. Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the
aides. Id at 806. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in a civil suit
for damages based upon their official acts, aides and advisors of the President of
the United States are not entitled to absolute immunity, but are entitled to
application of the qualified immunity standard thereby permitting the defeat of

insubstantial claims without resulting in trial insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Id at 818.
23 ir
24

See Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 1996).
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determination merge and the issue is the same under both concepts
with no additional layer of protection beyond that which is implicit
in the right to arrest on probable cause.'
In regards to excessive force, I thought that would be easier. At
least with probable cause there may be a little doubt about a
government official's reasonable belief in whether he can search or
seize. However, excessive force means the official has used force
that is unreasonable under the circumstances.
How can a government official reasonably believe that he could
use force that either a judge or jury decides was unreasonable
under the circumstances? Most of the courts have found that
reasonableness concerning excessive force is for the judge or the
jury to decide. Accordingly, if either finds there was excessive
force, then that is the end of it and there is no qualified immunity
anymore and the two concepts merge.
I think most of the courts went that way until the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Snyder v. Trepagnier." In Snyder, an officer shot
someone, who was running away from the scene of a crime, in the
back.27 When the case was given to the jury, the trial judge gave
the jury two questions to decide: the first question was whether the
officer used excessive force in shooting the individual in the back;
the second question was whether the officer had a reasonable belief
that his actions would not violate Snyder's constitutional rights.28
The judge in this case did two things. First he divided the case
into parts. The judge gave the jury a separate qualified immunity
question. Then the judge gave the jury a separate question of
whether or not excessive force was used, and if so was the officer
entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably believed that
the force was not excessive.29
Guess what the jury did? You know they are going to make life
hard for you. The jury decided yes, the force was excessive, but

25 d. at 948.

In Boyce, Claudine Boyce filed suit for damages from false arrest

against Vera Fernandes, a Peoria police officer. Id. The suit was dismissed on
the ground of public officer's immunity. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals
affirmed
the decision infavor of Fernandes. Id. at 951.
26
Snyder v. Trepagnier,142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998).
27ld.at 794.
28
29

i.
id
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the officer had a reasonable belief that it was not excessive and that
the force used did not violate any constitutional rights."
The case went before the Fifth Circuit, and the court was unsure
whether or not the issue of qualified immunity should go to the
jury.3' The court found that sometimes a qualified immunity issue
can go to the jury, however, the issue of qualified immunity is
usually one that is reserved for the court to decide. Certainly what
the right was, and whether it was clearly established, is an issue for
the court to decide.
The first problem is whether there is an extra layer of protection
afforded to an officer under qualified immunity. The second
problem is, if there is an extra layer of protection, who decides it?
Who decides what that extra layer of protection is? Is it a jury
question or is it a judge question?
There was a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court on the
issue.'2 The Court granted certiorari and reframed the question.
The Court found that the first question was whether a jury who
finds that a constitutional violation was incurred by the use of
excessive force in an arrest necessarily precludes a finding of
qualified immunity so as to make such dual findings
irreconcilable. 3 The Court found that the second question that
must be determined is whether a review in court may reconcile
apparent inconsistencies in special jury verdicts, despite possible
defects in special interrogatories submitted, by determining upon
review of the entire record whether the verdict as a whole was
reasonable and supported by the evidence."
What the Court was really asking is whether it takes one or two
questions to determine whether qualified immunity applies. This
whole business about excessive force and qualified immunity, is
that one question or two? As Posner asked, do the two things
merge and become one question, namely the reasonableness of the
officer's actions, or could you say that the force was objectively
unreasonable, but the official reasonably believed that it was not

3oId. at 799.
311id.
32

Snyder V. Trepagnier, 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999).

33Id. at 863.
34

Id.

at 863-64.
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unreasonable.35 Unfortunately, the case was settled and the Court
dismissed it pursuant to Rule 46 without making a determination
on the issue.36 This is a major issue, what do you do on something
like this. Qualified immunity in the Fourth Amendment area is an
issue that will come up again and again.
Suppose an officer testifies, "He turned and took something out
and I thought it was a gun and that is why I shot him." Further
suppose that the person shot testifies, "I did not do anything, I did
not have anything in my hand." On this type of record, one cannot
decide the qualified immunity issue.
If the only issue is evidentiary sufficiency, or in other words if
there is a dispute on the facts, does the qualified immunity issue
depend upon a factual determination? If it does, then there is no
qualified immunity and the defendant cannot appeal. The Court of
Appeals will scold you, those of you who represent police, for
trying to frame the issue as a qualified immunity issue when it is a
sufficiency of the evidence issue.
The court will look at whether there is a dispute over the facts
that the person had a gun, whether he was running away, whether
he looked suspicious or whatever issues arise in the Fourth
Amendment area. Those issues, as in any summary judgment
motion, are supposed to be determined at the trial and it does not
become a qualified immunity issue, which of course, is a major
contention in Fourth Amendment excessive force and unreasonable
search and seizure issues.37
As you can see from the cases, there is at least some authority
for holding that there is an extra layer of protection beyond the
factual determination of what happened. Even if a court did
determine that there was a Fourth Amendment violation, an officer
may have had a reasonable belief in what he did. The Supreme
Court found in Anderson v. Creighton38 and in Hunter v. Bryant 9

35 See Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 1996).
36

Snyder v. Trepagnier, 119 S. Ct. 1493 (1999).

37 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
39 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
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that if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause
existed, the officer may be entitled to qualified immunity."
However, the more difficult issue is who decides whether the
officer should receive the extra protection of qualified immunity.
Suppose you go to trial in those circuits where the courts have
decided there is an extra layer of protection, then the question is
not only whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, but whether
the officer reasonably believed in what he could do. Who decides
that question at the trial? Do you ask for a set of special
instructions? Does the judge decide that question? In Snyder v.
Trepagnier,we thought we were going to get an answer and could
talk about it,4 ' however, there really are two major questions in that
area that we are going to have to take a look at.
A couple of years ago in County of Sacramento, the Supreme
Court attempted to provide a road map for qualified immunity
cases.'- There was a whole issue as to whether there is a special
pleading requirement for qualified immunity. The Supreme Court
to anticipate a defense of qualified
said no, you do not have
4
'
out
it
lay
immunity, just
However, the Fifth Circuit had a special pleading requirement
for qualified immunity. After Crmvford-El v. Britton,' I thought
40 Id The Court held that Secret Service agents who had arrested the plaintiff
after he delivered a letter threatening the president, were entitled to qualified

immunity because their decision to arrest the plaintiff was reasonable, even if
mistaken. Id. at 228-29; See also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 636. The Court held
that an FBI agent was entitled to qualified immunity after conducting a

warrantless search of a home because he had a reasonable belief a bank robbery
suspect was in the home. Id.

142 F.3d. 791 (5th Cir. 1998), 119 S.Ct. 1493 (1999)(cert. denied).
42 523 U.S. 833 (1998). The case involved a Sacramento Police Officer who
entered into a high-speed automobile chase with a motorcycle, resulting in the
4

death of one of the passengers of the motorcycle. Id at 837. The estate of the

decedent commenced an action claiming the decedent was deprived of his
Fourteenth Amendment rigjt to due process, more specifically, his right to life.
Id at 837.

43 County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998).
44See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). The Petitioner was a
prison inmate who commenced an action claiming Respondent had diverted
boxes with legal materials, belonging to him, in order to interfere with his
constitutional right of access to the courts. Id at 580. The Supreme Court held
that the petitioner was not required to adduce clear and convincing evidence of
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there goes the Fifth Circuit qualified immunity. However, I did
some research and found a more recent case called Reyes v. Sazan,
in which the Fifth Circuit did not believe that the Supreme Court
decision in Crawford-El had undermined their heightened pleading
requirement in qualified immunity cases.4"
In Crawford-El, the Supreme Court laid out a whole procedure
for what happens in qualified immunity cases.46 First the Court
found that there is no heightened pleading requirement, but if there
is an affirmative defense of qualified immunity, a judge can order a
reply.47 Therefore, at that point you do not have to plead under a
heightened requirement, but a judge may order a reply.
The Supreme Court held in Crawford-El that "we are not going
to allow the qualified immunity defense, it is not only a defense on
the merits, but it is a defense to a government official having to
undergo trial and we will give trial judges some weapons or
procedures to try to get rid of cases that should not go forward."48
Therefore, there is no heightened pleading requirement. A judge
can order a reply and can limit the discovery to issues of whether
the events occurred at all or not. You can then have a summary
judgment motion. The Court provides a four or five-step process
for trying to get rid of cases early without having to go through the
entire issue.49 The Court further provides a road map for dealing
with a qualified immunity defense. The Court is streamlining the
whole process concerning the qualified immunity defense.
The issue then becomes when is a right clearly established. In
Wilson, the Supreme Court actually dealt with that issue."° The
major problem here is determining how narrowly or how broadly
to define the right. In Anderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court
found that the violated right cannot be defined so broadly that it
becomes an issue of whether the Fourth Amendment establishes
that unreasonable searches and seizures violate the Constitution."'
improper motive in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id at
594.

41 168 F.3d. 158 (5th Cir. 1999).
46

47
48

Crawford-El, 523 U.S. 574.

Id. at 595-98.
1d. at 597.

49 id.
50 Wilson

v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1629 (1999).

51Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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You will never get qualified immunity if the issue is that broad.
Plaintiffs would be able to convert the defense of qualified
immunity into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by
alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Therefore, it cannot
be relied upon that the Fourth Amendment clearly establishes that
a government official cannot make an unreasonable search and
seizure.
On the other hand, you cannot require a fact pattern that fits
exactly this situation. I have seen the Second Circuit on numerous
occasions say that there are only three people in this case and only
two people in this case and therefore the fight was not clearly
established. Moreover, I have seen a number of cases come down
recently where a right is defined in such narrow terms that it is not
clearly established whether the officer could not do this thing on
this day. Then, of course, the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity.
There has to be some kind of generality connected with whatever
the right is, but it cannot be so broad that everything will fit within
it. There are several cases dealing with the contrast and tension
between trying to define the right broadly and trying to define it
52 -

narrowly.

Since we are dealing with abstract principles, if you cannot
retaliate against a teacher for saying certain things, then the fact
that a deputy sheriff performed the same type of act should not
make a difference because the right was clearly established with
respect to all public employees. There is a series of cases dealing
with that issue where parallel decisions were sufficiently precise to
define the right.53
Sometimes there is absolutely no precedent of any kind,
however, it is clear to the court that even without precedent an
officer cannot take certain action. An example of the lack of
precedent can be found in Conn v. Gabbert.' In Gabbert v. Conn,
the Ninth Circuit found that while no precedent exists, it is obvious
that a police officer cannot search a lawyer while the lawyer is
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.833 (1998); see also Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
53 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at
52 See

641.
54526 U.S. 286 (1999).
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outside the grand jury room and thereby deprive the attorney of his
liberty interest in practicing law.55 However, the Supreme Court
found that no Fourteenth Amendment right was violated in this
case by the "brief interruption" of the attorney's right to engage in
his calling.5
There are several cases, one from the Seventh Circuit, in which
an officer acted in a way that is so far outside the realm of
reasonableness that you do not have to look for a precedent on
point.5 Therefore, there are cases where the actions of the officer
are extremely unreasonable.
There is a case that I used to cite, Doe v. Renfrow,58 where an
officer conducted a strip search of a 13-year-old female student in
school. There is just no justification, no circumstances under
which an officer can do that. The Seventh Circuit held that even
though there is no precedent concerning the officer's actions, such
actions cannot be performed. 9
On the other hand, there may be times when you do have to look
for a precedent. Then the question becomes what precedent do you
look at. Clearly, Supreme Court precedent will do. Moreover,
ruling precedent within the circuit or within the state may suffice.
Additionally, precedents from other circuits will suffice if there is
nothing to the contrary in your circuit.
In Wilson,' the Supreme Court had to decide whether a
homeowner's right had been violated when federal marshalls
permitted a media "ride-along" during the execution of an arrest
55Gabbert

v. Conn, 131 F.3d. 793 (9th Cir. 1997).

56 Conn, 526 U.S. at 292.
57

See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980)

58 Id. at 91. Junior high school students brought a civil action suit against

police chief and school administrators after they were sniffed by police dogs
during school hours. "As part of the drug investigation, plaintiff alleged that she
and three other students 'were compelled to remove their clothing and submit to
visual inspection by defendant's' agents."' Id. at 91-92.
59 Id. at 93. "It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a
nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of
some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known principle of
human decency." Id.
60 Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999). In Wilson, the Court held "A
media "ride-along" in a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the
state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in this case took
place, respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity." Id. at 1693.
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warrant for the petitioner's son. Deputy federal marshalls and
local sheriffs deputies allowed a newspaper reporter and a
photographer to accompany them on their early morning raid of the
petitioner's home." The Court held it was a Fourth Amendment
violation although the question was not obvious from the general
principles of the Fourth Amendment that the authorized intrusion
of the media into the petitioner's home violated the Amendment.'The Court did not look to precedent at all, and the general
principles of the Fourth Amendment did not dictate a result.
Moreover, it was a common police practice. Everybody did it.
Therefore, if everybody did it, then the practice was not clearly
established. That is what the Court held. Additionally, there were
no judicial opinions holding that this practice was unlawful.
The only published decision referenced in Wilson as being
directly on point was a state intermediate court decision which,
although it did not engage in extensive Fourth Amendment
analysis, nonetheless held that such conduct was not
unreasonable.' The respondents also identified two unpublished
District Court decisions dealing with media entry.6' However this
was not enough. Intermediate courts, unreported unpublished
District Court decisions, how could they establish the law if it is
not published? The last reason proffered was that the federal
marshals had a published rule and regulation that permitted media
accompaniment and, in effect, told them that what they did was
acceptable.65
Therefore, on those four grounds the Supreme Court suggested
that the practice was not clearly established.' However, you have
61

Id at 1693.

d. at 1700. The Court found that "[a]ccurate media coverage of police
activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the
general principles of the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in
this
case violated the Amendment." Id
63 Id
(citingPrahlv. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768,782 (Wis. 1980)).
62

6d.

(citing Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (ND Ohio 1984)):

Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (SD Cal. 1980).
65 Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700-1701 n.4.
66 Id. at 1701. The Court determined that, "Given such an undeveloped state
of the law, the officers in this case cannot have been 'expected to predict the

future course of constitutional law."' Id. (quoting Procunier v. Mavarette. 434
U.S. 555, 562, (1978)).
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to look at the general principles of the Constitution and the fact
that everybody did it. The case law is not conclusive one way or
the other and there is not a lot of it, nor is there much instruction
concerning the rules and regulations governing the practice. In
combination, those four elements established that the law was not
clearly established and therefore the marshals were entitled to their
Fourth Amendment liability to qualified immunity.67
What I have outlined is how qualified immunity is established.
Sometimes it can be established by a specific court decision, and
sometimes it can be established by a prior decision. There are cases
dealing with court orders where sometimes there is a court decree
or order. Therefore, the law on qualified immunity in a Supreme
Court decision should be followed, then a lower court decision in
the same jurisdiction, and finally lower court decisions in other
jurisdictions.

67 Id.

(pointing to the split among the circuit courts on this Fourth Amendment
issue, the Court states that "If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question,
it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the
controversy").

